The Stern Review reported a social cost of carbon of over $300/tC, calling for ambitious climate policy. We here conduct a systematic sensitivity analysis of this result on two crucial parameters: the rate of pure time preference, and the rate of risk aversion. We show that the social cost of carbon lies anywhere in between 0 and $120,000/tC. However, if we restrict these two parameters to match observed behavior, an expected social cost of carbon of $60/tC results. If we correct this estimate for income differences across the world, the social cost of carbon rises to over $200/tC.
Risk Aversion, Time Preference, and the Social Cost of Carbon
The social cost of carbon (the SCC) estimates the discounted value of the damage associated with climate change impacts that would be avoided by reducing carbon emissions by one tonne. It is a useful measure for assessing the benefits of climate policy at any point in time. It is generally thought to increase over time, and textbook economics would recommend that carbon emissions be taxed by a price set equal to the SCC. The Stern Review [18] [19] [20] reported a SCC in excess of $300/tC in the absence of any climate policy -an estimate that lies well above the upper bound of $50/tC that was found in an extensive literature survey and meta-analysis 26 . Many analysts have attributed this high estimate to the very low rate of pure time preference adopted by the Stern author team 1, 11, 13, 14, 30 .
Others 5, 29 have argued that the Stern Review also included unusual assumptions about risk aversion. We respond to this observation by exploring the relative sensitivity of the SCC to both the pure rate of time preference and the rate of risk aversion. Our results support the hypothesis that the assumed rate of risk aversion is at least as important as the assumed rate of time preference in determining the social cost of carbon even though our analysis reveals an enormous range of estimates.
Some are negative (that is, showing social benefits), but our positive estimates span six orders of magnitude on the positive side depending on both the pure rate of time preference and a standard measure of risk aversion.
Philosophers would likely confront this range by choosing a particular estimate based on what they deemed to be appropriate reflections of both parameters 3, 4, 12, 15 . This approach was adopted in the Stern Review, but here we take a different tact. Instead of imposing our own normative values on the selection of a single SCC estimate, we look at the behaviours of democratically elected governments to infer distributions of the rates of risk aversion and pure time preference that are actually used in practice. We use the resulting probability density to constrain the estimates of the SCC and compute its expected value. Perhaps surprisingly, the expected social cost of carbon turns out to be reasonably close to the value reported in the Stern Review.
To be sure, climate change is a long-term problem. This is why the pure rate of time preference is so important. Greenhouse gas emission reduction over the near-term would mitigate future damages, but they would do little to alter the present climate and/or the present rate of change in climate impacts. The costs of emission abatement must therefore be justified by the benefits of avoided impacts in the future. It follows that any statement about the desirability of climate policy necessarily contains a value judgement about the importance of future gains relative to present sacrifices. The discount rate employed in benefit and cost calculations over time can be thought of as the opportunity cost of investment, but it can also be seen as the relative value of consumption over time. The two are equivalent if the economy is in a dynamic equilibrium; and this equivalence means that time preference is not alone in playing a critical role in determining any SCC estimate.
To explain why, we note that people discount future consumption for two reasons. Firstly, they expect to become richer in the future, and so they care less about an additional dollar then than they do about an additional dollar today. Secondly, they are impatient. We also recall the so-called Ramsey discount rate r that was designed to sustain optimal saving over time 16 . It consists of three components:
where ρ is the rate of pure time preference, g is the growth rate of per capita consumption, and η is the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption.
Both motives of personal discounting can be detected in the Ramsey rule for dynamic optimality by considering the rate at which people would be willing to sacrifice a dollar of current consumption for additional consumption in the future (see the SOM for brief details). The pure rate of time preference is defined implicitly by the marginal rate of substitution between present and future consumption under the condition that consumption levels in both periods are equal (so that g = 0). In words, the definition of the pure rate of time preference calibrates inter-temporal trading so that individuals who anticipate constant levels of consumption from one period to the next would be willing to sacrifice one dollar of present consumption if he or she would be compensated with $ (1 + ρ) of extra consumption in the next period. Higher values of ρ therefore reflect higher degrees of impatience because higher compensation would be required to compensate exactly for the loss of $1 in current consumption.
Consumption levels need not be constant over time, and the second term in Eq (1) works the implication of this fact into this trading calculus. While g measures the growth rate of material consumption, ηg reflects the growth rate of happiness measured in terms of underlying personal utility.
If consumption were to climb by g · 100% from one period to the next, then each future dollar would be worth g · η · 100% less (assuming no impatience so ρ ≡ 0). It follows that our individual would consider sacrificing one dollar in current consumption only if he or she could be compensated by an amount equal to $(1 + gη) in the future.
In contemplating welfare-based equivalence of consumption over time, it is now clear that this trading-based accommodation of growing consumption works in exactly the same way as the pure rate of time preference in defining the rate at which the future needs to be discounted. Put another way, if one considered empirical estimates for both ρ and η that range from zero to three, then both parameters should play equally important roles in determining the appropriate discount rate. Perhaps because "impatience" is intuitively clear while the role of the "elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consumption" is not, the debate over how the SCC could be so high has focused undue attention over ρ almost to the exclusion of η.
This need not be the case; indeed, the utility-based association with the Ramsey discounting rule shows that this should not be the case. Climate change is not only a long-term problem; it is also a very uncertain problem and a problem that differentially affects people with widely different incomes.
The rate of pure time preference ρ speaks only to the first characteristic of the climate policy problem -the time scale issue. The elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consumption, the parameter η, speaks to all three characteristics. It is, first of all, a measure of the curvature of the utility function, which maps material consumption to happiness. It indicates precisely the degree to which an additional dollar brings less joy as income increase. Moreover, the parameter η can also be interpreted as a measure of how one evaluates a gain of a dollar for rich person relative to a gain of a dollar for a poor person. This is why η is occasionally referred to as the parameter of inequity aversion. At the same time, curvature in the utility function can be viewed as a reflection of risk aversion. In this role, η explains why risk-averse people buy insurance; they are willing to pay a premium that is proportional in first order approximation to the parameter η to eliminate variability in outcomes because doing so increases their expected utility. 1 Armed with these insights from the first principles of microeconomic theory, we used the integrated assessment model FUND to test the hypothesis that η could actually turn out to be more 1 The risk premium is, by definition, the difference between the expected outcome of a risky situation and the "certainty equivalent" outcome -the guaranteed outcome that would sustain a level of utility equal to expected utility across the full range of possible outcomes. For a risk averse individual, the certainty equivalent is always less than the mean because losses relative to the mean reduce utility more than equal gains above the mean. We estimated the SCC for a range of values for ρ and η, but we report our results in stages to highlight the triple role of η. We first consider results for cases in which η affected only the discount rate. That is, we pretended that uncertainty about climate change had been resolved and that income differences between countries were irrelevant. The second set of results put uncertainty back into the problem; the reported expected values of the SCC are the product of a Monte Carlo analysis of all the uncertain parameters in the FUND model. A third batch of results were drawn from the original world of perfect climate certainty, but social cost estimates applied equity weighting to climate-driven globally distributed differences in income. Finally, we report expected social cost estimates for cases in which both uncertainty and equity-weighing play a role -the cases where η plays its theoretically appropriate triple role. Estimates of expected social cost are similar when equity weighting is added to the complication of uncertainty. Panel D reflects is a local a maximum at ρ = η = 0 as before where E(SCC) = $2,036/tC, but the global maximum is E(SCC) = $120,977/tC at ρ = 0, η = 3. E(SCC) is lowest for a high ρ and a medium η; E(SCC) = $9/tC, for example, at ρ = 3.0%, η = 0.90. Note that the E(SCC) is strictly positive for this, the theoretically correct scenario.
For reference, Lord Stern of Brentford chose ρ = 0.1%, η = 1; in our calibration through FUND, the result was E(SCC) = $721/tC. Since the Stern Review essentially ignored equity weighing, though, E(SCC) = $333/tC is a more comparable statistic. The Stern Review estimate E(SCC) = $314/tC, which is remarkable close. However, note that the Review used the PAGE 10 model -which truncates the tails of distributions of input parameters, that FUND fully recognizes 3 , but keeps vulnerability to climate change as in 1995 while FUND has vulnerability declining with development -the two main differences between the two models roughly offset one another.
We used two different approaches to inform our representations of combinations ρ and η that reflect actual practice across decision-makers. In the first, we worked with results from Evans and Sezer 6, 7 , who estimated η = 1.49 ± 0.19 for 22 rich and democratic countries from income redistribution data 17 . They also independently estimated ρ = 1.08 ± 0.20 using data on mortality rates.
Assuming normality, these results support the probability density function on ρ and η displayed in Panel A of Figure 3 . The first row of Table 1 records estimates of the expected value of the SCC derived from this distribution for the four cases described above (see Supplementary Online Material for details). Ignoring concerns about equity and uncertainty, E(SCC) = -$1/tC. Considering either equity or uncertainty alone increases the estimate to 13/tC or 62/tC, respectively. Uncertainty is again seen to play a larger role in determining the social cost of carbon than equity. Considering both equity and uncertainty produces the fourth estimate: E(SCC) = $210/tC. Equity and uncertainty reinforce one another.
Our second approach relied data on per capita consumption growth rates, inflation rates, and nominal interest rates for 27 OECD countries from 1970 to 2006. We interpreted observations of the real interest rate (r in equation (1) Table 1 shows the sensitivity of E(SCC) estimates to the difference. Ignoring uncertainty and equity, E(SCC) = $41/tC; it is much higher than the estimate reported in the first row from the Evans and Sezer distribution because lower values of ρ and η are deemed more likely. As before, considering either equity or uncertainty increases the E(SCC), this time to $59/tC and $117/tC, respectively. The effects of equity and uncertainty are now less pronounced because extreme values of ρ and η receive lower probability mass than before.
Finally, as before, uncertainty dominates equity. However, in this case, equity moderates uncertainty;
considering both simultaneously produces an estimate for E(SCC) of $228/tC. Again, equity and uncertainty reinforce one another.
The third row of Table 1 shows E(SCC) estimates for a combined probability density function of ρ and η produced by multiplying the two PDFs in Figure 3 and rescaling them to integrate to unity.
The estimates lie in between the previous results, but closer to the initial results derived from the Evans and Sezer PDF. The qualitative pattern is the same, though. Uncertainty dominates, and is reinforced by equity. Combining all of this information, our final estimate is E(SCC) = $206/tC.
Lord Stern 18 has expressed a preference for debating philosophically about the appropriate discount rate for the benefits of mitigation. We bow out of that debate by exploring the ramifications of actual decision makers and actual developed economies. We find that aversion to risk aversion is as important in determining SCC estimates as time preference. More specifically, we offer high estimates for the SCC given operational combinations of risk aversion and time preference even with a model that incorporates relative conservative damage estimates (including benefits early) and autonomous adaptation drive by regional economic development. 
APPENDICES
A. A utility-based rationale for Equation (1) To uncover the utility-based interpretation of the Ramsey (1928) optimal saving rule, consider a two period environment wherein inter-temporal discounted utility is given by
with C t indicating consumption in period t (t = 1,2). Totally differentiating this relationship defines an inter-temporal marginal rate substitution (i.e., the rate at which an individual would trade current consumption for future consumption while maintaining the same level of discounted utility):
The interpretation in the text -that the Ramsey rule can be interpreted as representing the sum of an impatience effect and the effect of diminishing marginal utility with increasing consumptionfollows.
B.
FUND details including website address.
This paper uses version 3.0 of the Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation and Distribution
(FUND). Version 3.0 of FUND corresponds to version 1.6 15, 18, 20 , except for the impact module. The tangible impacts are dead-weight losses to the economy 6 . Consumption and investment are reduced without changing the savings rate. As a result, climate change reduces long-term economic growth, although consumption is particularly affected in the short-term. Economic growth is also reduced by carbon dioxide abatement measures. The energy intensity of the economy and the carbon intensity of the energy supply autonomously decrease over time. This process can be accelerated by abatement policies, an option not considered in this paper.
The endogenous parts of FUND consist of the atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and sulphur hexafluoride, the global mean temperature, the impact of carbon dioxide emission reductions on the economy and on emissions, and the impact of the damages to the economy and the population caused by climate change. Methane and nitrous oxide are taken up in the atmosphere, and then geometrically depleted. The atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide, measured in parts per million by volume, is represented by the five-box model 7, 11 . The model also contains sulphur emissions 19 .
The radiative forcing of carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, sulphur hexafluoride and sulphur aerosols is as in the IPCC 13 . The global mean temperature T is governed by a geometric build-up to its equilibrium (determined by the radiative forcing RF), with a half-life of 50 years. In the base case, the global mean temperature rises in equilibrium by 2.5°C for a doubling of carbon dioxide equivalents.
Regional temperature follows from multiplying the global mean temperature by a fixed factor, which corresponds to the spatial climate change pattern averaged over 14 GCMs 12 . The global mean sea level is also geometric, with its equilibrium level determined by the temperature and a half-life of 50 years. Both temperature and sea level are calibrated to correspond to the best guess temperature and sea level for the IS92a scenario 8 .
The climate impact module 16, 17 includes the following categories: agriculture, forestry, sea level rise, cardiovascular and respiratory disorders related to cold and heat stress, malaria, dengue fever, schistosomiasis, diarrhoea, energy consumption, water resources, and unmanaged ecosystems.
Climate change related damages can be attributed to either the rate of change (benchmarked at 0.04°C/yr) or the level of change (benchmarked at 1.0°C). Damages from the rate of temperature change slowly fade, reflecting adaptation 17 .
People can die prematurely due to temperature stress or vector-borne diseases, or they can migrate The impacts of climate change on coastal zones, forestry, unmanaged ecosystems, water resources, diarrhoea malaria, dengue fever, and schistosomiasis are modelled as simple power functions. Impacts are either negative or positive, and they do not change sign 17 .
Vulnerability to climate change changes with population growth, economic growth, and technological progress. Some systems are expected to become more vulnerable, such as water resources (with population growth), heat-related disorders (with urbanization), and ecosystems and health (with higher per capita incomes). Other systems are projected to become less vulnerable, such as energy consumption (with technological progress), agriculture (with economic growth) and vector-and water-borne diseases (with improved health care) 17 . The income elasticities 17 are estimated from cross-sectional data.
The social cost of carbon (SCC) is estimated by running the model twice, perturbed and unperturbed.
In the perturbed run, an additional one million metric tonnes of carbon are emitted in each year between 2001 and 2010. The difference in impacts is computed and discounted back to the year 2000, using the discount rate as specified in Equation (S2). The difference is then divided by 10 mln tC to obtain an incremental cost estimate. That is, 
• SCC r is the regional social cost of carbon (in US dollar per tonne of carbon);
• r denotes region;
• t and s denote time (in years);
• I are monetised impacts (in US dollar per year);
• E are emissions (in metric tonnes of carbon);
• δ are additional emissions (in metric tonnes of carbon);
• ρ is the pure rate of time preference (in fraction per year);
• η is the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consumption; and
• g is the growth rate of per capita consumption (in fraction per year).
We first compute the SCC per region, and then aggregate, as follows (S4) 16 2000, • SCC r is the regional social cost of carbon (in US dollar per tonne of carbon);
• Y world is the global average per capita consumption (in US dollar per person per year);
• Y r is the regional average per capita consumption (in US dollar per person per year); and
• ε is the rate of inequity aversion; ε=0 in the case without equity weighing; ε=η in the case with equity weighing.
In the case of uncertainty, we compute the expected value of the SCC, as follows:
• E(SCC) is the expected value of the social cost of carbon (in US dollar per tonne of carbon);
• i indexes the Monte Carlo run;
• MC is the number of Monte Carlo runs; MC = 1000; and
• θ is the vector of uncertain input parameters, fully specified on http://www.fundmodel.org/ C. The rate of risk aversion, the pure rate of time preference, and the discount rate We compute the SCC and the E(SCC) for a range of the pure rate of time preference (ρ) and the rate of risk aversion (η), and we also compute a weighted average using three alternative bivariate PDFs for ρ and η, as follows:
The first bi-variate PDF of ρ and η assumes that these parameters are normally distributed with μ ρ =1.08%, μ η =1.49, σ ρ =0.20%, σ η =0.19 and σ ρη =0. See Table S1 . The second bi-variate PDF is degenerate. It corresponds to a bi-variate normal PDF of r and g with μ r =3.45%, μ g =2.70, σ r =2.56%, σ g =1.61 and σ rg =0 (see Table S2 ) and r = ρ + ηg. The third bi-variate PDF is the convolution of the first two. D. The impact of CO 2 fertilization on the social cost of carbon.
In the main text, we find that social cost of carbon is positive for a high value of η if equity weighing is included and uncertainty is not. We assert that this is because of CO 2 fertilization of agriculture, which has large benefits in developing countries in the short term. High values of eta emphasize these benefits. In order to test this assertion, we reran the model with the CO2 fertilization switched of. Figure S1 compares the results. With CO 2 fertilization, the SCC falls with rising η. Without CO2 fertilization, the SCC first falls (as the discount rate increases) but then starts rising (as the rising discount rate is more than compensated by the increasing equity weights). 
